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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~ILLIAM TIMOTHY SAVAGE, aka 
TIM SAVAGE, aka W. T. SAVAGE, 
d/b/a SAVAGE CONSTRUCTION, and 
~. T. SAVAGE CONCRETE, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
GARY WAYNE HILLIS, EXQUISITE 
HOMEBUILDERS, INC., and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 14603 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to reverse an order of the Industrial 
Commission which established that plaintiff, William Timothy 
Savage, et al., had employed Gary wayne Hillis thus creating 
a status of employer-employee between these two parties 
respectively. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff, as employer of defendant Gary Wayne Hillis, 
was ordered by the Industrial Commission to pay compensation to 
Gary Wayne Hillis as a result of damages received by Hillis which 
were sustained in an industrial accident. Defendants request that 
this Court sustain the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the Industrial Commission. 
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----
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
While defendants agree with the basic factual statement 
in plaintiff's brief, it is felt that emphasis should be placed 
on certain facts which were given only cursory treatment therein. 
In obtaining the particular job in question, defendant, 
Hillis, called plaintiff, Savage, when he became aware of Exquisite 
Homebuilders' need of a new subcontractor for cement work. (Tr. 
pg. 11). Hillis did not have the required contractor's license Md 
could not, therefore, take on the job himself. He knew Savage had , 
such a license. In fact, the same arrangement had been used on other, 
jobs. Both men sought work together, Hillis as an employee of Savage/ 
because only one man had the license required to subcontract in ( 
this state. (Tr. pgs. 26-2 7) In seeking the particular work in 
question, as in times past, the two men discussed the employment 
agreement on the morning they first talked with Exquisite Homebuilde' 
(Tr. pgs. 22-23) This was before either party did any work on we 
subdivision in question, the actual date being September 20. (Tr. 
pg. 22) Consistent with their agreement with each other and wiw 
) 
Exquisite Homebuilders, once the work was completed, Exquisite 
paid Savage who in turn paid Hillis. (Tr. pg. 23) 
It is true that Exquisite called Hillis personally to 
begin the work which resulted in Hillis' injury, (Tr. pg. 14) but 
it is also true that Exquisite first tried to contact Savage and 
could not because he was out of town. Given the foregoing dis cussi; 
of facts, the only reasonable inference possible is one consistent 
with the thought that since Savage, the subcontractor, is out, we 
will call his man Hillis to get the job done. To infer from the 
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phone call that Hillis was an employee hired separate and apart 
from Savage is not realistic. This is especially true in view of 
the fact that Savage finished the work in question. Mr. Hillis 
stated at page 28 of the transcript: 
Q. And it was your understanding, was it not, 
that these people had contracted through 
Mr. Savage, because he was a licensed 
contractor to do a particular job? 
A. Yes, sir. 
(See also Tr. pg. 41, lines 15-19). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
WERE BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING AND 
WERE ENTERED PURSUANT TO § 35-l-85, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953. 
§ 35-1-85, u.c.A., 1953, reads: 
After each formal hearing, it shall be the 
duty of the commission to make findings of fact 
and conclusions of law in writing and file the 
same with its secretary. The findings and 
conclusions of the commiss~on on tuest~ons of 
fact shall be conclus~ve and f~na and shall 
not be subject to review; such questions of 
fact snail ~nclude ultimate facts and the 
findings and conclusions of the commission. 
The commission and every party to the action 
or proceeding before the commission shall 
have the right to appear in the review pro-
ceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall 
enter judgment either affirming or setting 
aside the award. [emphasis added] 
In interpreting this section, the Supreme Court has 
said in McVicar v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 56 U. 342, 
191 P. 1089, (1920), at 1090: 
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The record is not without evidence to 
support the findings and conclusions of the 
commission • • • If the commission erred in 
its findings of fact and conclusions, we 
cannot correct the error Since it 
does not clearl and indubitabl a ear that 
e ~scret~on o e comm~ss1on as been 
abused, its decision is final and unassailable. 
[c~tation om~tted, emphasis added] 
While that case was discussing the issue of dependency ~dl 
the Court there states that dependency is a question of fact, certain' 
it cannot be argued that the existence of an employer-employee 
status is not also a question wherein the commission must consider 
various facts and arrive at a conclusion. Once having done this 
the deter.mination of the commission is final and not subject to 
When plaintiff asks the court "to reverse the findings of 
the Industrial Commission and enter its Order accordingly to the 
effect that neither William Timothy Savage, Savage Construction 
Company, nor W. T. Savage Concrete, Inc. was the employer of Gary 
Wayne Hillis on the first day of October, 1974" (plaintiff's brief 
at page 6), he is asking the Court to do something which it cannot 
do by statute. 
Plaintiff's brief ignores the substantial evidence pla~d 
before the Comm~ssion which was discussed above. The Commission 
had credible evidence before it indicating the existence of an 
employer-employee relationship between Savage and Hillis. It does 
not appear that "the discretion of the Commission has been abused", 
its decision on this matter should be affirmed. 
1 
Plaintiff argues at page 5 of his brief: 
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The fact the Mr. Savage paid cash to Mr 
Hillis after the work was done and after Mr: 
Hillis had been injured in no way creates the 
condition of employer-employee as between 
them on the date of the injury and one cannot 
becom7 an employer by acquiescence or by the 
creat~on of an employer-employee relationship 
which did not exist at the time simply by 
words used thereafter. 
While those statements are true when standing alone, 
certainly payment of monies is one fact to be considered by the 
Commission and should logically be juxtaposed with the evidence 
indicating that prior to the accident, an employer-employee relation-
ship was established between Hillis and Savage. 
POINT II. 
§ 35-l-42, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, OFFERS RELIEF 
TO AN INJURED WORKMAN WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE OF A SUBCONTRACTOR BUT 
NOT TO THE SUBCONTRACTOR, HIMSELF. 
§ 35-l-42, u.c.A., 1953, falls into a category of 
workman's compensation statutes which inter alia. impose liability 
for coverage upon a general contractor when a subcontractor does 
not carry coverage for its employees. Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
~' Vol. lA, § 49.11 states, "The purpose of this legislation 
was to protect employees of irresponsible and uninsured subcontractors 
by imposing ultimate liability on the presumably responsible 
principal contractor . • " (emphasis added] 
The apparent intent of such statutes, then, is to protect 
injured workmen. The relief granted by statute is available to the 
injured claimant and not to the "irresponsible and uninsured sub-
contractor". 
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It is also stated in Larson, supra, that under most 
statutes "the general contractor who has been required to pay 
compensation in these circumstances can obtain reimbursement 
from the subcontractor". If, in this case, the subcontractor 
were allowed to claim protection from§ 35-1-42, u.c.A., 1953, 
the illogical position would be reached wherein Savage could force 
Exquisite to pay the benefits ordered, and Exquisite in turn could 
force Savage to reimburse Exquisite. It should be obvious that ~e 
legislature had no such intent in mind when they passed the section 
in question. As a result, Savage cannot, when he finds himself in 
trouble due to his own "irresponsible" action, seek protection from 
a statute designed to benefit his unprotected employee. To so 
construe this statute would kill any incentive on the part of sub-
contractors to carry coverage for their own employees. Their own 
irresponsibility would save them money in that they could avoid 
paying premiums for coverage because they know they can claim 
protection from this section and the general contractor will have 
to pay. The law should not and cannot be used to condone such 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that there 
was substantial evidence before the Industrial commission to support 
their finding that an employer-employee relationship existed betwee: 
plaintiff, Savage, and defendant, Hillis. There is no indicationc: 
claim that the Commission abused its discretion in finding as it d:. 
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Finally, the benefits of§ 35-1-42, U.C.A., 1953, should not 
protect an irresponsible subcontractor from the results of his 
own actions. 
DATED this _____ day of November, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Attorney for Defendants 
Rawlings, Roberts & Black 
400 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
328-9741 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was sent 
to Louis M. Haynie, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 1847 West 2300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, this _____ day of November, 1976. 
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